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Schizophrenia sufferers may have Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. These deficits are not 
as severe as those shown by people with other disorders such as autism, because schizophrenic 
patients can solve simple ToM tests using their Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and general problem-
solving skills. 
Our aim was to study ToM by asking a group of schizophrenics to perform a mental verbs 
task. We then identified the categories into which the mental verbs were grouped and their use 
profile, and assessed the influence of intelligence quotient. 
We observed that those with a higher IQ had lower ToM deficits. Subjects with average 
IQs grouped the mental activities quite well and those with low IQ performed the task poorly as a 
result of the combined effects of schizophrenia processes and low IQ.  
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RESUMEN 
En la esquizofrenia pueden aparecer dificultades en Teoría de la Mente (TM). Tales 
déficits son menores que los que se manifiestan en otros trastornos puesto que estos pacientes 
resuelven pruebas sencillas de TM utilizando su Cociente Intelectual (CI) y habilidades generales 
de solución de problemas. 
Nuestro objetivo sería estudiar la TM, utilizando una tarea de verbos mentales en un 
grupo de esquizofrénicos. Así, se identificarán las categorías en las que se agrupan los verbos 
mentales, su perfil de uso  y, se examinará la influencia del cociente  intelectual. 
En esta investigación se observa una compensación de los déficits en TM en función del 
CI. Los sujetos con CI medio organizan mejor las actividades mentales y  los de CI inferior 
presentan un efecto acumulativo de los procesos de la esquizofrenia y del CI que se refleja en una 
peor realización de la tarea de verbos mentales.  
 




1. INTRODUCTION  
 
According to Doody Götz, Johnstone, Frith and Cunningham (1998)  and Thomas (1997)  
in 1956 Diamond presented evidence to support the theory that schizophrenia sufferers were 
incapable of correctly internalizing the points of view of other people so as to be able to predict 
their behaviour. Also according to Brüne (2003), in 1958 Conrad argued that impaired 
perspective-taking was the main characteristic of the early stages of schizophrenic disorders. The 
cognitive anomalies that underlie the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia are evidence of a fault 
in a fundamental mechanism for conscious experience. This mechanism is known as Theory of 
Mind (ToM), metarrepresentation or a knowledge of oneself based on what other people know. 
Schizophrenic patients may have problems when it comes to making inferences about the 
intentions and the knowledge of the person they are talking to, and when it comes to using these 
inferences as a guide in their discourse (Guinea, Tirapu & Pollán, 2007). It has in fact been 
suggested that schizophrenia may be a self-awareness disorder that causes problems in relation to 
voluntary action, self-control and control over the intentions of other people (Bentall & 
Kinderman, 1998; Perona, Cuevas, Vallina & Lemos, 2003). Frith went a stage further when she 
suggested that metarrepresentation problems are due to difficulties in representing propositions 
that contain mental states such as “think that” or “believe that”, given that the part of the 
representation that includes the mental verbs is separate from the rest of the representation 
(Drury, Robinson & Birchwood, 1998). 
Similarly, Corcoran (2000), Corcoran, Cahill and Frith (1997), Corcoran, Mercer and 
Frith (1995), Mazza, De Risio, Roncone and Casacchia (2001) and Pickup and Frith (2001) all 
observed ToM failings in different groups of schizophrenic patients. However these failings 
diminished when patients were grouped together according to their intellectual quotient (IQ) and 
their results were compared. For example both Brüne (2001) and Corcoran et al. (1995) 
concluded that acute schizophrenics had difficulties in performing different ToM tasks correctly 
and that results could be influenced by IQ. This would imply that ToM deficits are related to the 
patients’ IQ and there is therefore a link between ToM and intelligence (in particular with verbal 
IQ) irrespective of diagnosis, age or sex (Bora, Yucel & Pantelis, 2009; Standford, Messinger, 
Malaspina & Corcoran, 2011). A high IQ would therefore compensate for slight ToM deficits, as 
it would enable the patient to use general problem-solving skills rather than ToM abilities 
(Pickup y Frith, 2001). 
Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles and Van Os (2003) and Langdon, Coltheart, Ward and Catts 
(2002) also observed that people with chronic schizophrenia and normal IQ obtained worse 
scores in ToM stories than people without the pathology. According to these researchers the link 
between IQ and ToM task-solving was logical but insufficient to explain the mistakes made in 
the tasks. Frith and Corcoran (1996) and Marjoram et al. (2005) observed that the group with 
behavioural signs showed ToM errors, even when IQ and memory were controlled. They 
therefore suggested that there was a specific ToM deficit in schizophrenia that could not be 
accounted for solely by the effects of IQ. Neither Abdel-Hamid et al. (2009), Mazza et al. (2001), 
Mazza, De Risio, Tozzini, Roncone and Casacchia (2003) and Mazza, Di Michele, Pollice, 
Casacchia and Roncone (2008) could find any link between the performance of ToM tasks and 
IQ. They claimed that the variable IQ had no significant effect on ToM performance, and that the 
ToM failings were sufficiently serious not to be affected by what they regarded as irrelevant 
variables (Sprong, Schothorst, Vox, Hox & Van Engeland, 2007). Some researchers even 
proposed that the ToM deficits observed in schizophrenics are completely unrelated to 
psychopathology or intelligence, which would mean that poor ToM performance is a trait, and 
not a state, of the illness (Koelkebeck et al., 2010).  
What is clear is that the deficits in schizophrenics are much less serious than in people 
suffering from other disorders such as autism. This could be because as we mentioned earlier 
schizophrenics can perform simple tests such as first-order tasks using their IQ, in other words 
using their general problem-solving skills rather than their ToM skills. In fact some researchers 
have observed that a high IQ can offset ToM deficits, while patients with a low IQ (62 ± 11) 
suffer the combined effects of their schizophrenia and their low IQ, and perform worse in the 
tests  (Bora et al. 2009;  Doody et al., 1998; Mitcheley, Barber, Gray, Brooks & 
Livingstone,1998; Sarfati, 2000; Scheeren, Rosnay, Koot & Begeer, 2013).  
Schwanenflugel et al. devised a useful tool for studying ToM that explores the meaning 
and use that children give to verbs that describe mental activities. For these researchers the 
appearance of new concepts about mental verbs and the changes in the organization of these 
concepts that take place in the growing child are consistent with the development of a 
constructivist theory of mind during the school years (López-Herrero, Mendoza, Muela & 
Shergill, 2006; López-Herrero, Mendoza, Muñoz, Fresneda & Carballo, 2007; Mendoza, 2001). 
They also observed an intentional, abstract use related to the construction of mental spaces 
separate from reality, which allows children to conceive intentions and false beliefs. In a 
linguistic sense, a semantic mastery of the mental verbs could be achieved through the 
deployment of meta-representational capacities (Bouchand & Caron, 1999; Naigles , 2000).  
In particular, the transformation of ToM in infancy can be observed in the progress 
children make in aspects of processing / information in relation to mental actions, by which these 
actions are organized and extended, without interruption, from the perceptive to the conceptual, 
from the outer world to the inner world and from the input category to the output category. 
Another characteristic of ToM development is that which states that people view the question of 
certainty as important not only depending on their age, but also on their level of understanding of 
what is required of them in comprehension-type tasks. In fact memory-related activities are seen 
as the most certain, input/output activities as moderately uncertain, and processing tasks as the 
most uncertain (Clark, Schwanenflugel, Everhart & Bartini, 1996; Moore, Pure & Furrow, 1990; 
Schwanenflugel, Fabricius & Alexander, 1994a; Schwanenflugel, Fabricius & Noyes, 1996; 
Schwanenflugel, Henderson & Fabricius, 1998; Schwanenflugel, Martin & Takahashi, 1999). On 
the basis of these organizational schemes,  Schwanenflugel, Fabricius, Noyes, Bigler  and 
Alexander (1994b) and  Schwanenflugel et al. (1998) proposed that mental verbs be grouped into 
three categories: Input, Memory and Processing.  
The main objective of our research is to study ToM using a mental verbs test in a group of 
subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia (Clinical Group) and compare their answers with those 
achieved by a group of normal subjects (Control Group). This objective could be divided into the 
following sub-objectives: 
Assess the relationship between Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and ToM skills. 
Identify the categories into which the mental verbs are grouped and the verbs in each 
category. 
Describe the meaning and the use profile attributed to mental activities. 
 2. METHOD  
2.1. Participants 
The Clinical Group was made up of 27 schizophrenic patients evaluated, diagnosed and 
treated at the Psychiatry Unit of the Melilla (Spain) Local Authority Health Area. Members of the 
group complied with the following conditions: maximum age of 55 years, no mental retardation, 
verbal comprehension (minimum centil score-5), no hearing or neurological problems, or drug 
addiction (no drug use in the previous six months), having completed at least the minimum level 
of Spanish education (School-Leaving Certificate or similar- 8 years of education-), attendance at 
psychiatric check-ups and use of medication.  
They were chosen on the basis of the psychiatric diagnosis established by the Unit, which 
in turn is based on World Health Organization criteria for classifying mental and behavioural 
disorders (ICD) for the various types of schizophrenia  (20.0, n= 16. 20.3,  n= 2. 20.5, n= 7. 20.6, 
n= 2) and also of The Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS) (Kay, Fiszbein and Opler, 
1987; Spanish version by Peralta and Cuesta, 1994).Patients with more than one psychiatric 
diagnosis were excluded.   
The Control Group was made up of 20 adults (students of 4th Year of Compulsory 
Secondary Education and from the Seniors University at the University of Granada). None of 
them had a history of psychiatric diseases. Our aim was to make this group as similar as possible 
to the Clinical Group, in terms of age and educational background. The essential socio-
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Factor “g” Test (Cattell & Cattell, 2001): The Spanish version of the Measuring 
Intelligence with the Culture Fair Tests  was used to assess IQ. Scales 2 and 3 of this test (Form 
A) were applied. The scales are composed of the following subtests: completing series, 
classifying, solving matrices and evaluating conditions. Elements are presented in graphic form, 
with virtually no cultural content, and examples are given to help the subject to understand and 
perform the task.  Scale 2 is applied to schoolchildren from 8 to 14 years of age, as well as to 
adults with little academic training.  Scale 3 is intended for students in the later stages of 
secondary education and initial stages of university education, and also for adults in general with 
a relatively high educational level.   
Wechsler’s Intelligence Scale for Adults-III: Vocabulary Test (Wechsler, 2001): In 
this test the subject is presented with a set of words both orally and visually and is required to 
define their meanings. 
Mental Verbs Test (López-Herrero, Mendoza & Santos, 2008): the construct of ToM is 
measured with an extensive mental verbs test similar to that used by Schwanenflugel et al., 
(1994b) made up of 28 sentences, half of which are affirmative and the other half interrogative. 
These sentences must be completed with at least three of the 14 mental verbs offered as possible 
replies. When selecting the verbs the subject has to choose the ones that best suit each sentence 
because i) when replacing one verb with another it does not change the meaning of the sentence, 
ii) it completes the sentence or iii) it answers the question raised. One of the items in the test was: 
(COMPLETE) I don’t know where I left my umbrella and I have to ... guess, learn, pay 




The Clinical Group carried out the tasks individually, in order to maintain levels of 
motivation and to avoid tiring the subjects. All the tasks described above were completed: the 
Factor ‘g’ Test, the WAIS III Vocabulary Test and the Mental Verbs Extension Task.  The 
Control Group carried out the Factor ‘g’ Test and Mental Verbs Task collectively. This was 
undertaken in a single session in view of the lower number of tasks and the speed with which 
they were accomplished. A clinical trained psychologist applied the tasks to both groups and took 




The Multidimensional Scaling were used to examine the way the two Groups organized 
the mental verbs and the meaning they gave to them. 
The data inputted into these Multidimensional Scaling are understood as subjective 
estimates of the proximity between stimuli, so what we obtain is a distribution in a space with 
various dimensions, such that the distances between the stimuli in this space correspond to the 
proximities expressed subjectively. In addition a series of axes are extracted which represent the 
scale or attribute used by the subject when estimating the proximities, and the place of the stimuli 
on each of these scales in the form of coordinates on the corresponding axis (Real, 2001). 
The most interesting area for applying this kind of analysis is that of cognitive 
development in which researchers have tried to demonstrate that small children organize the 
stimuli along perceptual dimensions, while older ones use vaguer, more complex dimensions. 
They are also very useful for understanding the effects of context as they show us that the relative 
weights in the dimensions vary depending not only on age but also on the particular context, 
which produces a change in the data structure (Shoben & Ross, 1987).  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Designation and use of mental verbs by the Control Group  
This group obtained the following stress and fit measurements: normalized raw stress 
0.0789, dispersion accounted for (D.A.F.) 0.921 and a Tucker’s congruence coefficient of 0.9597. 
Figure 1 shows the spatial representations of the verbal stimuli and in these 
representations we can see that the mental activities are grouped into the following categories: 
Input (I): made up of the verbs pay attention and listen; which means that look is missing 
and understand is added (General -G-). 
Memory (M): made up of the verbs remember and know. Learn is also added to this 
category. (G). 
Processing (P): made up of guess, compare, believe, decide, choose and think  (believe 
and guess are put into this group because the maximum point of inclusion established is 0.03). 
The verbs look (I) and search (G) are also added. 
 An analysis of remoteness shows that look (I) and think (P), marked with *, are the 
furthest away, both in terms of the spatial representations of all the verbs as with look, or with 
regard to the group to which it belongs as in the case of the verb think (P).  
As regards the position of the stimuli on the corresponding axes of abscissas (dimension 1 
-D1-: certainty-uncertainty) and ordinates (dimension 2 -D2-: internal/conceptual - external/ 
perceptive) we observe that when naming the different quadrants in clockwise order, the three 
categories of mental verbs are distributed as indicated below: 
I: the verbs in this category are in the second quadrant. 
M: these verbs are centred on the first quadrant. 
P: the verbs in this category appear above all in the fourth quadrant, although one verb 













































































































 3.2. Designation and use of the mental activities by the Clinical Group  
In order to assess the influence of IQ on ToM skills, all members of the group achieved 
the established minimum score (C-5) in the WAIS-III Vocabulary Test. Moreover, taking into 
account the absence of mental retardation, the level of education and the age of the subjects, as 
well as the fact that the mental activities task uses verbs which are acquired at an early age, it 
may be concluded that the clinical group did not present difficulties in this task.  
For the IQ, the subjects were divided into the following three groups on the basis of their 
results in the Factor “g” Test (Cattell and Cattell, 1990): subjects with a low IQ or LOWIQ (IQ 
between 71-79), subjects with normal-low IQ or NORMLOWIQ (IQ 80-89) and subjects with 
































LOWIQ obtained the following stress and fit measurements: normalized raw stress 
0.1027, D.A.F. 0.8972 and Tucker’s congruence coefficient  0.9472. 
Figure 2 shows the spatial representations of the mental verbs in such a way that the verbs 
can be grouped into the following categories: 
I: made up of pay attention and look; listen is missing and compare is added (P). 






























P: contains the verbs guess, believe, decide, choose and think. Compare is missing and 
look (G) and remember (M) are added. 
Non-proximity is limited to the verbs look (I), think (P) and know (M). 
The position of the mental verbs on the corresponding axis of coordinates shows us that: 
I: centred on the fourth quadrant. 
P: in the first and second quadrants 
 



































Figure 4. Spatial representation of the mental verbs according to the results for the Low IQ group. 
 
 
NORMLOWIQ showed these stress and fit measurements: normalized raw stress 0.0862, 
D.A.F. 0.9137 and Tucker’s congruence coefficient 0.9559. 
The mental verbs are grouped into the following categories (Figure 3): 
I: made up of pay attention, look, listen and also search (G). 
M: no group formed. 
P: consisting of guess, compare, believe, decide, choose and think; remember (M) is 
added. 
The remotest verbs are look (I) and think (P). 
If we observe the position of the stimuli on the two dimensions or axes, we can see that: 
I: is located in the third quadrant. 




























































































































AVIQ obtained the following fit and stress measurements: normalized raw stress 0.0784, 
D.A.F. 0.9215 and Tucker’s congruence coefficient 0.9599. 
The mental verbs are grouped into the following categories: 
I: with pay attention, listen. Look is missing (I) and learn/understand are added (G). 
M: made up of remember, know. 
P: made up of guess, compare, believe, decide, choose and think; search (G), and look (I) 
are added. 
The remotest verbs are understand (G) and think (P). 
If we observe the position of the different verbs on the axes of coordinates, we can see 
that: 
I: is in the third quadrant. 
M: fourth quadrant. 











































































































4. CONCLUSIONS  
In this study the analysis centred on the question of whether the answers given by the 
Control and Clinical Groups in the mental verbs task are related with the IQ. Therefore we 
ascertain the categories in which the mental activities are grouped and we identify the verbs 
forming each group, and also we describe the meaning and utilisation attributed to the mental 
activities.  
 
4.1. Control Group 
There are three categories of mental verbs in this group: I, M and P. Categories M and P 
are complete, that is they contain all the verbs that they normally contain; In Category I however 
the verb look is missing, as it was put into Category P. This is not surprising if as Schwanenflugel 
and her co-authors propose in 1998, look has a different meaning to see and is regarded as a more 
uncertain verb and is therefore close to the Processing category. There are also a number of 
versatile mental verbs that fall within the General (G) group. These verbs may also belong to 
other categories and cannot be defined within one particular group or grouped together to form a 
specific group of their own. This means that their use profile is very broad but is still correct. In 
this case they appear in I understand (G), in M learn (G), and in P search (G).  
When we analyse the remoteness we find that look (I) is the remotest verb in the spatial 
representation of the data. This is due to the characteristics it shares with the processing verbs. 
Similarly, although think forms part of the processing category, it is the most distant, due to its 
evaluative function, as think is a very common cognitive activity that forms part of a variety of 
cognitive processes (Rips & Conrad, 1989; Schwanenflugel et al., 1994b, 1998).  
If we start from the position of the verbal stimuli in the two dimensions established by 
Clark et al. (1996), Moore et al. (1990) and Schwanenflugel et al. (1996, 1998, 1999): dimension 
1: certainty - uncertainty; dimension 2: internal and conceptual - external and perceptive), we find 
that the I verbs are defined as external, perceptive and certain; and are situated in the second 
quadrant. Those belonging to the M category are internal, conceptual and certain, and appear in 
the first quadrant. The P verbs are mainly in the fourth quadrant and are regarded as doubtful, 
internal and conceptual mental verbs, except for the verb choose, which appears in the third 
quadrant and is defined as external and perceptive. 
From the data set out above, we deduce that the Control Group assigns specific meanings 
to mental activity verbs, a fact reflected in the clear definition, differentiation and formation of 
categories I, M and P. The activities that fall within category G have a broader use profile and 
can thus appear in categories other than their own without this damaging or contaminating the 
new categories into which they fall. This suggests that the Control Group’s use of mental verbs is 
very correct and mature and they do not suffer any communication deficit, as they are aware that 
their knowledge, needs, intentions and desires may be different from those of other people and 
may manifest themselves in different ways. 
 
4.2. Clinical Group 
Great instability can be observed in the categories in LOWIQ. The I Group is not 
complete, as the verb listen is missing. At the same time it contains compare (P), a verb that is 
not usually found in this category. There is no M Group and P is also incomplete and mixed with 
verbs from other categories: it does not include compare, but remember (M) is added. For its part 
in NORMLOWIQ the I and P categories are complete, although the latter includes a verb from 
another group remember (M). The M verbs however do not form a group as they are very far 
apart. AVIQ groups the mental verbs into the three categories (I, M and P) and their composition 
is similar to that obtained in the Control Group, which means that they appear well-defined, 
complete and made up of the verbs that they normally include, with the exception of the verb 
look (I) which falls within the P category. In the different IQ-based groups the verbs in Category 
G form part of the I and P groups without this affecting the definition of these categories. 
Non-proximity is centred, in general, on look (I) and think (P), except in the LOWIQ 
group in which know (M) also appears and in the AVIQ group to which understand (G) is added. 
The position of the mental verbs in the dimensions reveals that LOWIQ defines the I 
verbs as internal, conceptual and uncertain and the P verbs as certain, internal and conceptual, 
except in the cases of the verbs believe, decide and choose, which appear as external and 
perceptive. The NORMLOWIQ group defines I as a category made up of external, perceptive and 
uncertain verbs and P as a category made up of internal, conceptual and very uncertain activities, 
except for the verbs believe and think, which are defined as more certain. In the case of the AVIQ 
group, the I category appears as external, perceptive and uncertain, and M as internal, conceptual 
and uncertain, while P is very certain, internal and conceptual, except in the cases of the verbs 
compare and choose, which are defined as external and perceptive. 
With all this data, we can conclude that the distribution of mental verbs into the input, 
memory and processing categories improves as IQ increases. This was manifested by the fact that 
in LOWIQ we observed groups with severe deficits, as there was no M category and the I and P 
categories were not complete and included verbs that did not belong to them or to the G category 
(a more flexible group in that its activities can also be included in other categories). In 
NORMLOWIQ the categories were more complete, except in M, for which there was no group, 
as occurred in LOWIQ. The only verb totally out of place was remember (M) which was in P. 
However the AVIQ Group classified the mental verbs in a very similar way to the Control Group, 
in that the three categories were clearly defined and were made up of the verbs that they should 
contain, except for look (I) which is situated near P; and the only verbs included in these 
categories that did not actually belong to them were verbs from category G, as also occurred with 
the Control Group. At the same time, there was an increase in stability in line with IQ in terms of 
remoteness, as in LOWIQ the distance was greater, and affected know (M) as well as the usual 
verbs look (I), which is more of a processing activity, and think (P), which is a common 
evaluative cognitive activity that can also form part of other cognitive processes (Rips & Conrad, 
1989; Schwanenflugel et al., 1994b, 1998). The fact that understand (G) appears in AVIQ, as a 
non-proximate action is not relevant due to the versatility of the verbs in category G. For its part 
and in relation to the position of the stimuli on the axes of the coordinates, it is the AVIQ group 
that best informs on spatial representation, although it only coincides with that found in the 
Control Group in which I is external and perceptive, M and P are internal and conceptual, except 
for the cases of compare (P) and choose (P), which are defined as more external, perceptive 
activities. It is important to remember that these characteristics of choose were also observed in 
the Control Group (Clark et al., 1996; Moore et al., 1990; Schwanenflugel et al., 1996, 1998, 
1999). 
Therefore in line with Standford et al. (2011) and  Sun Chung, Kang, Shin, Yoo and 
Kwon (2008) we support the view that poor performance in certain tests (for example; various 
memory tests) can be offset by the patients’ IQ. In particular in our study we observed an 
offsetting of the ToM deficits in line with IQ, in such a way that the subjects in the AVIQ group 
are the ones who organize, distribute and catalogue the mental activities best, and therefore use 
the verbs of mental activity correctly. The explanation for these results lies, as Doody et al., 
(1998), Mitcheley et al., (1998) and Sarfati (2000) also proposed, in the fact that a high IQ can 
compensate for ToM deficits, as it allows the subjects to use general problem-solving skills 
instead of ToM skills, while patients with a low IQ show the combined effects of the 
schizophrenia processes and their IQ, which in our research results in a worse performance in the 
mental verbs task, which would suggest that they do not use these verbs correctly in their 
everyday lives. 
In spite of this, the structuring made by AVIQ when positioning the mental activities on 
the axes of coordinates is not as accurate as that of the Control Group, which means that, in line 
with the findings of Bora et al., (2009), Brüne (2001, 2003), Corcoran et al. (1995), Janssen et al. 
(2003),  Langdon, Coltheart, Ward and Catts (2001) and Langdon et al., (2002), we can assert 
that IQ and the solving of ToM tasks are related, but that this relation is not sufficient to fully 
explain the erroneous execution of ToM tasks and that there are other aspects apart from IQ, such 
as the signs and the symptoms of schizophrenia, and attention, concentration and difficulties with 
selective memory, which also affect the solution of the extensive mental activity verbs task (Bora 
et al., 2009; López-Herrero et al., 2007). We therefore believe that in future research, it would be 
necessary to analyse the relation of these factors in the execution of ToM tasks. We also think, as 
other authors have suggested, that it would be important to include different tests that evaluate all 
aspects of ToM, so as not to rely solely on the mental activities test (Brune, 2003). We also 
recommend that a larger participants group be used in future research. 
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